

**NIGERIA'S MULTILATERAL POLICY AND REGIONAL
ORDER OF WEST AFRICA IN THE
POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

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Abstract

The article assesses the role of Nigeria in the international order of West Africa. It seeks to establish the nexus between Nigeria's multilateral policy and international order of West Africa. This is premised on the ongoing instability in the region as a whole. As Middle East, Gulf Region, and East and South-East Asia regions are always assured of the United States' presence in the event of any conflict or instability, such assurance is not available in West Africa. West Africa is a home of 16 independent countries in the African continent. The presence of two principal colonial masters (Britain and France) has been greatly noticeable in the region from colonial days and the region generally has received scanty attention in the international order literature. Unlike the Gulf and the Middle East region, the West Africa region is unipolar in nature and it is obvious the most important actor maintaining international order is Nigeria. Given the presence of two erstwhile colonial masters in the region, the region becomes more complicated and the assertiveness of Nigeria's hegemonic role cannot complete without an historical and contemporary analysis of events in the region, most especially in relation to Nigeria's multilateral policy. This is the essence of this paper and it endeavours to produce a theoretical framework pertaining to future direction of international politics of the region and the role a regional power like Nigeria plays in maintaining peace and order. This is expedient considering the dwindling presence of global powers in regional affairs which implicitly promotes and supports the role of pivotal state in the regional order. The article adopted textual mining and latent content analysis in interpreting the existing documents, newspapers and articles while manual transcription is employed for interview conducted.

Keywords: Nigeria, International Order, International System, Cold War, West Africa

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Introduction

The West African countries are abode of economic and security woes for the most part of 20th century. The fact that the region is geographically not totally within the orbit of neither the West nor East made it suffered from structural malfunctioning in the Cold War era (Akinrinade, 1998:176). In fact, most of the incessant conflicts that pervaded the socio-political terrain of the region did not receive proper attention of the global powers. This may be because the region was not so important in the East-West confrontation during the Cold War. Apart from apartheid South Africa, the only country that was significantly attracted the minds of the United States (U.S.) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) is Nigeria (Wright, 1998:138). This was so because of the market potential and the pivotal role of Nigeria in African politics during the Cold War era. However, the demise of Cold War heralded a new phase in the politics of the region as some state actors from the West and East started to develop ambitious interests in the region despite its chronic economic and political malaise. Three factors can be pinpointed which make the region attractive to the outside world in the post-Cold War period. They are: (1) The presence of the valuable resources like oil and diamond; (2) The presence of Nigeria as big market; and (3) The threat of militant and insurgent groups in the region. All the above variables make the region a political flashpoint.

The need to keep the region safe has become an important factor in the establishment of a security mechanism like ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and African Standby Force (ASF). West African countries, other state actors and non-state actors alike have been part and parcel of this crusade. The prominent of all state actors are Nigeria, France, Britain, the U.S. and lately China. While non-state actors like ECOWAS, African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) have been parts and parcels of the order in the region in the Post-Cold War era. To critically delve into this issue, the article is divided into conceptual sections which are intended to give proper attention to the concept of order as it relates West African sub-region. It also need to be stated here that the activity of governmental international organizations will not be given much attention; the role of Nigeria as important state actor in the region will be given priority vis-à-vis multilateral policy.

Definitions: West Africa and Cold War

The spatial dimension of West African is the most complicated in Africa; this arises because of the indefinite geographical location of the region. For convenience purpose, the sub-region of West Africa is located clearly in the middle of Africa bordering the Gulf of Guinea and Sahara desert in North Africa. This explanation covers the unanimous definition of West Africa by scholars and the UN (Alli, 2012:11; Nwoke, 2005:112). If this description is correct then one is safe to assert that West Africa is home to 16 countries including the Saint Helena, the overseas British territory. Therefore, in actual fact, all 15 members of ECOWAS are qualified as West African states together with Mauritania who withdrew its membership in 2000 from the union (Busse et. al., 2004:2). If Saint Helena is treated as a state then it suggests that West Africa comprises 17 countries altogether.

In terms of population and number of states, it is the most significant of all African regions. With nearly 340 million populations in 2013, its demography dwarfs other regions of Africa; and it is also home to the largest number of states in Africa (Iheduru, 2003:55). With this in mind, such region is bound to play decisive role in the global politics and naturally will attract the attention of global powers. Another notable characteristic of the region is its colonial experience. The region experienced three major colonial powers: Britain, France and Portugal. Today, the language of the ex-colonial powers have been well entrenched as the major official languages of the region both in ECOWAS and public life. This shows that the region is divided by language and colonial experience. Another interesting fact is the presence of Nigeria in the region, a country with the largest population and economy in the whole of Africa. Nigeria's population and its relative diverse economy make the region attractive to the outside world.

Politically, the region achieved relative stability during the Cold War era and this can be explained in term of presence of the two global political powers in the region which exercised a degree of political decorum (Sesay, 1998:45). Although, some scholars are of the view that the region was not so important to the global powers during the Cold War period; this was not so. There is evidence which suggests the importance of the region to the outside powers during the intense Cold War era. For example, during the energy crisis of the 1970s the US and other western powers were compelled to source for West African oil of which Nigeria was a major supplier (Nwoke, 1991:246). And if I may ask: what are the factors that make a region

significant in the international politics? The answer, in my humble view, should be natural endowments of the region. It is the presence of oil in the Middle East that makes the region so attractive to the West. Although, strategic location can also be a crucial factor especially in the case of the Middle East; scholars have also identified Gulf of Guinea in West Africa as an important strategic location to the global power rivalries (Obadare, 1996: 138-139; Osuntokun, 2005:46).

In this case, if scholars could say that the West Africa was not attractive to geo-political calculation of the powers in the early days of the Cold War, this may be acceptable. From 1970s, the period of energy crisis, the region was a focal point in the global contest for energy and other raw materials like rubber, diamond and cotton (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 218). Except for Nigerian civil war which lasted for 3 years(1967-1970) and Chadian civil war of 1980s, there were no major intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the West Africa sub-region during the Cold War era. Scholars have provided many reasons for the relative peace and stability in Africa during this time. One of such reasons is the psychological presence of the two superpowers on the world stage (Thomas, 1998:6).The global south was divided into two sphere of influence-capitalist and communist camps each trying to assert control over states in the south. The result of this contestation is the relative stability imposed by the rivalries on the international political stage. The balance of powers of the Cold War era is said to be simple to govern since there were two poles of powers vying for allies in the global south.

The end of the Cold War signified by the unity of the two Germanies and collapse of the USSR with attendant emergence of 15 Commonwealths of Independent States (CIS) resulted in the renewal of hostilities in the developing countries and other former Soviet satellites(Olsen, 1998:348). The African problem began with Liberian and Rwandan political stalemate and many countries followed suit. The nature of order in the international system therefore broke down which gave rise to many centres of powers with the U.S. as the sole global hegemon. The corollary of this is the changing in the nature of order in the West African region in the Post-Cold War era.

Concept of International Order

Order is an elusive concept which may be difficult to define in terms of discipline affiliation. Concept of order in law, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, economics and

international studies are defined differently but what remains to be sure is whether all these discipline are referring to the same situation as order. Order in the sociological parlance is defined in terms of societal order that ensure the public safety in the conduct of daily life(Taylor, 2010). Sociology still refers to the concept of order in the family life discussion. In this way, order is defined in terms of ability of the head of family, usually father, to ensure order within the micro family circle (Fox, and Murry, 2000). This definition of order does not really capture what it means in the international relations parlance. In the environment of legal jurisprudence which sees law as its bedrock, order in most cases, becomes the primary concern. In this way, order is defined in terms of ability and capacity of law enforcement agents to keep peace and order in the society in order to forestall safety of lives and property(Rothschild, 1995). The absence of order is usually disorder which brings about commotion, rudderlessness, turbulence, anarchy, chaos, and conflict in the society.

However, in this type of essay it is not possible to explore all fields of enquiry's definitions of order and in this case order in our definition will toe the line of international studies with liberalist and realist orientations. But there is harmonious convergence in the definitions of order: The need to ensure tranquility in any given societyseems to be the central tenets of order in all fields of enquiry. There are some states that lack legitimacy and necessary political apparatus to maintain order within their boundaries(Rotberg, 2003:3). In such an instance the states' orderare maintained or sustained by outside powers through unilateral or multilateral mechanism(Alagappa, 2003:37). This is expedient in order to prevent spillover effect of conflict in the global political space. Therefore, the focus of order in this article will be at domestic and international level with the latter taken precedence over the former.

Furthermore, international order is also likely to be confusing as the concept of order itself. The fact that the conceptualization of order is ambiguous tends to suggest the same for international order. If order cannot be perpetually sustained at national level how can it be achieved at international level where interests diverge? In this case it is necessary to delve into the working definitions of what constitute international order. The concept of international order has been given less prominence in the discussion of international relation scholarship and this may due to the over flooding of idea in the cognate research area. The study of regimes, multilateralism and institutions has been given better focus which is believed to represent the

international order in the global politics (Alagappa, 2003). In this way, the concept has been equated as having the same connotation with international society which is alluded to by Hedley Bull (Bull, 2002). According to Bull, international society occurs when states, the principal entity in the global politics, mutually agreed to come together for a common interest through establishment of institutions that will ensure and guarantee the common values (quoted in Jackson and Sorenson, 2013:142). From this definition it seems Bull gives credence to the willingness of states to achieve common goals which a state cannot ordinarily attain through the establishment of international organizations or institutions to maintain order in the global arena. This is the case of Nigeria in West Africa.

Development of Nigeria's Multilateral Policy

The idea of multilateral diplomacy in advancing Nigeria's hegemonic posture in Africa and global politics can be traced to pre-colonial period. It was the realization of the pivotal role of Nigeria in Africa that motivated Nigerian government to act through multilateral institutions (Adeniji, 2005:1). By 1919, some prominent Nigerians had been advocating for the need to secure independence from the British through Pan-African Movement which had its root outside Africa, specifically from Central America.

The idea of emancipation of all black territories from the shackle of imperialism propelled some distinguished Nigerians who lived and educated in England and the U.S. to join their counterparts from other parts of the globe. Nigerians like Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe (known globally as Zik of Africa) joined the Pan-African Conference that was held in Manchester in 1945, shortly after the Second World War (Adoghome, 2008:8). The essence of holding the meeting was to make sure that the African issues were tabled and considered at the time the UN was to be created. Also, to make sure that the normative principles inherent in the Atlantic Charters were applied to the African race. The pivotal role of Nigeria in the global politics through multilateral institutions was ingrained in 1919 when Nigeria and other British West African countries like Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone formed National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) with the sole objective of liberating the continent from the colonial yoke (Eluwa, 1971:205). In fact, a delegation was set up in 1920 among the countries and the delegation headed to London to meet colonial leaders on the need to demand for greater participation of Africans in their own domestic affairs. Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary at the

time rejected their demands (Eluwa, 1971:207). The rejection of the demands, perhaps, was one of the reasons that fuelled the need to strengthen the unity of Africans towards emancipation and decolonization of the continent.

Therefore, the establishment of NCBWA laid a solid foundation for the future multilateral undertakings in Nigeria. The idea behind the multilateral organization was that it is far better to act in unison than individual action. In the years preceding the Second World War, the Pan-African Congress in the U.S., Jamaica, Haiti, Grenada, Cuba, London and France had been well established and known. The simple demand of the pan-African congress was the racial equality and independence of all African territories (Legum, 1966:528). It was in the midst of this global event that Nigeria under the umbrella of NCBWA represented the African nations in Manchester Conference of Pan-Africanism in 1945. Notable among African dignitaries were Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, William Tolbert from Liberia, Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria (Legum, 1966:533). There were also many delegates from the Caribbean and North America. All these events resulted in agitating for the establishment of autochthonous African international organizations. By 1950s some African countries already became an independent entity and in this case Ghana, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria started to champion the course of establishing OAU (Omach, 2000:77). It did not come to fruition until Nigeria gained independence in 1960. The independence of Nigeria in 1960 further enriched the progress that led to the formation of the continental organization. The independence established Nigeria as the 99th member of UN and became the largest African member in both the UN and Commonwealth of Nations. The establishment of the OAU in 1963 after much internal disagreements by the African nations signified the triumph of African leaders to take their destiny into their hands (Touray, 2005:637). With the formation of OAU, many issues remained lingering in the minds of Nigerian leaders seeing the country as the automatic leader of African destiny.

One of such issue was the continuous domination of some African territories by the Europeans. Second, the political fragility of the African states rooted in the artificial boundary creation by the colonial powers. The third major issue for Nigerian leaders was how to pursue regional integration cum economic development in the midst of global political climate of the time. All these issues left many questions unanswered and the Nigeria's leaders after

independence decided to redress the global imbalance through multilateral institutions (Adeniji, 2005:2). The creation of continental organization did not satisfy the appetite of Nigerian leaders for multilateral policy. In 1964, Nigeria proposed the need for the creation of West Africa Economic Council(WAEC). Also, Niger Basin Commission and Lake Chad Basin Authority were formed at the instigation of Nigerian government to manage the water basin among the neighbouring countries (FRHD and Iwuhoa, 2012:77). West African Examination Council (WAEC), which was formed in 1952, was agitated for to take care of the educational standard of Anglophone West African countries. Although it was established while Nigeria was still under colonial rule, it gained strength with the departure of colonial governments from the region. But the sub-regional economic organization was obviously impeded by the political climate of the time and most African countries were still trying to recover from the centuries-old domination from the colonial masters. So, forming any sub-regional organization became a nonissue to most of them as they would not like ceding their hard-won independence to any higher authority less they regret it (Kacowicz,1997:371). In other words, at the point Nigeria was advocating for sub-regional multilateral institution, most countries could not really understand the need for such a move. Most West African countries, in fact, were suspicious of Nigeria's domination because of its sheer size and population. This was how Nigeria failed in its bid to establish multilateral economic organization in West Africa in 1964. It was not until 1975, nine years later, when West African states agreed, through Nigeria diplomatic manoeuvre, to cooperate with Nigeria to establish ECOWAS.

Peacekeeping in the Mano River Region

Mano River region comprises four countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. Virtually all of them have suffered from political turmoil of which Nigeria has grossly involved in terms of peacekeeping operations. The first of this intervention occurred in Liberia in 1990. The civil war erupted in Liberia in December 1989 before the final fate of Cold War struggle. The Cold War might well explain the outbreak of the conflict in Liberia because of the assistance provided to Samuel Doe government by the US-backed military regime (Olonisakin, 1998:101). As the intensity of the Cold War eased, the National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Liberia (NPFL) under the command and leadership of Charles Taylor overran the Samuel Doe government and the conflict erupted in a large scale not ever witnessed in African history. As

pointed out by Professor Ogaba Uche, the Director of Research and Studies, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs,

The problems in Mano River Basin countries have received attention of various Nigerian governments, the problems of which Nigeria did not know anything about. Most of us are convinced that the problems were partly emanated from Cold War rivalries between powers most especially that of Liberia. Nigeria responded quickly in order that the conflict is arrested before assuming regional dimension (Personal Communication, January 28, 2015).

The concern of Nigeria about human disaster this may produce, if left unattended to, forced Nigerian government to sponsor a Banjul Conference in the early 1990 to intervene in Liberia (Ero, 1995). The problem lies in the fact that ECOWAS was not designed, from the incipient, to respond to such large scale crisis. Although Mutual Assistance Defence (MAD) was signed among the ECOWAS member in 1981, it has never been put to use (ECOWAS, 1981). Because of its overwhelming power in West Africa which gives rooms for mutual suspicion among the smaller countries in the region, Nigeria exercised restraint to sponsor any sub-regional military initiative which might reduce the incidence of conflict in West Africa. This was intentional in order to allay the fears of ECOWAS members about the hegemonic aspiration of Nigeria within the sub region (Osuntokun, 2010). Since MAD could not be invoked to respond to Liberian crisis, the Banjul Conference produced machinery under which the members had to respond to the crisis in Liberia (Salami, 2013:780). In this case ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) was formed to respond to Liberian crisis and this stance was supported by Article 52 of the UN Charter. The article is a UN initiative which stipulated that in the event of any outbreak of conflict, it may be beneficial for the regional initiatives or organisation to take over the responsibility of maintaining peace and order (Salami, 2013:779). And because of the familiar terrain of the regional organisation, it is assumed such may be in the best form to put the conflict to rest. It was under this liberty that ESMC was empowered to take over the responsibility of quelling the tide of conflict in Liberia (Daily Champion, October 15, 2010).

Thus, it was the ESMC that provided such regional initiatives for the military intervention in Liberia and with the subsequent creation of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as the military arms of ECOWAS. It was after the adoption of the resolution in 1990 that the ECOMOG force went to Liberia for peace keeping purpose (Hamman and

Omojuwa, 2013:28). Between 1990 and 1997 about 16,000 troops were stationed in Liberia with attendant financial cost (Agbakwuru, 2013). Out of the 16,000 troops produced by the ECOWAS members, Nigeria contributed 12,000 troops which amounted to 80% of all troops contributed (Hamman and Omojuwa, 2013:31). The president of Nigeria at the time, Ibrahim Babangida, lamented that:

Nigeria has no territorial ambition in Liberia or anywhere else. We are in Liberia because events in the country have led to the massive destruction of property, the massacre by all the warring parties of thousands of innocent civilians including those foreign nations, women and children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red Cross protection contrary to all recognized standard of civilized behaviour and international ethics and decorum. To those involved in false historical comparisons, intellectual intoxication and phantom analysis, I ask, should Nigeria and all responsible countries in the sub-region stand and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass grave yard? (Quoted in Salami, 2014:85).

Nigeria, therefore, could not wait for the lives of millions of Liberian people who were in danger while the international response seemed not forthcoming.

It was the Commission, the Responsibility to Protect (RP) that signaled the potential of the conflict degenerating into massive humanitarian disaster in West Africa. Based on this report, Nigerian president shoulder most of the responsibility to establish political decorum in Liberia (Bolarinwa, Personal Communication, January 27, 2015). Between January 1990 and 1996, UN adopted 15 Resolutions that commended the Nigerian-backed ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. One of the reports states: "...UNSC expresses its appreciation to the Chairman of ECOWAS for his initiative in organizing a regional summit on Liberia and to the Government of Nigeria..., and urges all parties to participate in the operation" (UN Report, 1995). Thus, the Liberian crisis with attendant intervention of Nigeria represented an important watershed in the humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War global politics.

Because of the huge financial and material loss suffered by Nigeria, the public tended to criticise the regime for such a flamboyant foreign military adventure. In response, the Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, asserted:

Perhaps many do not yet know, nor appreciate either the danger of international embarrassment the Liberian crisis

portends for all of us in this sub-region in particular, and to Africa and the black race in general ...Our critics tend to ignore the appalling human catastrophe which the Liberian crisis has created for us in this sub-region...for the avoidance of doubt, neither Nigeria nor the members of the ECOMOG forced their way into the Liberian conflict in a manner....Resembling military adventurism. Nigeria is a member of the sub-regional group that took a solemn decision to restore peace by separating the warring factions in Liberia,...(Babangida, 1990).

The declaration quoted above was in response to the domestic and international fear that Nigeria was on a subterranean mission to occupy a neighbouring country. To allay such a fear, Nigeria intervened according to the UN and ECOWAS mandate and in a certain case Nigerian commander in the Liberia, Joshua Dogonnyaro, was replaced with Ghanaian's just to make sure that its mission was not tarnished with propaganda from foes in the neighbouring countries (Adebajo, 2003:70). The replacement of Nigerian force commander with that of Ghanaian was also in response to the accusation of Nigeria's domination in the intervention. Overall, Nigeria made peace with the rebel leader, Charles Taylor and included him in the interim national government.

It is of interest to note that the pattern of governance in Africa remained the same all over. The Liberian political turmoil by 1997 replicated itself with the ousting of elected president from office by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone which was believed to have the backing from Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor (Fawole, 2004:39). The RUF had been receiving training under Taylors' leadership of NPFL in Liberia and the incident in Liberia in 1990 provided an incentive for the RUF to dethrone the duly-elected president, Tejan Kabah (Sesay, 1998:64). Since ECOWAS members had already agreed on a resolution of not recognizing undemocratic regimes in Africa, ECOWAS under Nigeria's leadership went ahead to reinstate President Tejan Kabah in 1998 (Osuntokun, 2010). The military junta promised it would return power to democratically elected president but refused to fulfil its promise, a step that forced the ECOMOG to forcefully launch an attack on the RUF (Osuntokun, 2010). The war in Sierra Leone continued unabated under the ECOWAS. The continuation of the conflict meant there was need for ECOWAS member, most especially Nigeria, to accommodate other multilateral organisation to stamp out the incessant war. It was based on this that OAU and the

UN peacekeeping forces intervened. But the killings and the kidnappings of the UN peacekeepers by the RUF rebels worsened the case. With the persistence of Nigeria-led ECOMOG who continuously sustained casualties without relenting effort, forced the rebel to surrender and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was able to capture the rebels and supervised election in Sierra Leone (Saliu, 2007:105). The president was finally reinstated in 1998 with Nigerian soldiers powerfully in the capital, Freetown, for peace building and personnel training.

Also, in Cote d'Ivoire, the similar fate befell the democratically-elected President Laurent Gbagbo in 2002. Nigeria, together with South Africa, Ghana and Senegal held a meeting for diplomatic solution to the crisis in Dakar (Ebohon and Isike, 2004:5). The Dakar meeting resulted in constituting a force that quelled the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. ECOWAS peacekeeping force for Cote d'Ivoire together with United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOMIC) was inaugurated under the leadership of a Nigerian Ambassador, Ralph Uwechue, as the Special Representative of the sub-regions peacekeeping operation (Omojuwa, 2013:28). Finally in 2004, the rebels were forced to surrender and the peaceful atmosphere prevailed once again in Abidjan and other parts of the country.

Appraisal

The complex nature of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone makes it difficult for anyone to objectively appraise the situation. Nevertheless Nigeria was able to quell the tides of war in both countries and warlords were subjugated despite initial setback encountered in the Freetown and Monrovia by Charles Taylor's faction. It would be recalled that some West African countries were reluctant to support Nigeria's cause in Sierra Leone and Liberia most especially Burkina Faso, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. Despite initial opposition by some West African states to intervention in Liberia by Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces, they were forced to accede to the intervention by plain national interests of parties involved. It should be recalled that by 1990 the civil war had produced over 300,000 refugees which began to be a source of worry to Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Guinea. The three countries were quick to agree to the intervention because of its implication on the regional security. On the part of Nigeria, its intervention was crucial based on the notion of being the natural leader of the region and its leadership is tacitly acknowledged by virtue of its resources endowment, military capacity and global recognition

relative to other countries in the region. Initially Nigeria's intervention by Ibrahim Babangida administration was to ensure the safety of Nigerians living in Liberia and to secure their safe passage to Nigeria.

Thus, the relentless effort of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to capture Monrovia, the capital of Liberia sent a wrong signal to the west African countries and in this case the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces was forced to combat Taylor in Monrovia which jeopardize the neutrality of the intervention party in the conflict. But the insistence of Nigeria, despite losing many troops in the battle front, on enforcing peace in the country returned relative peace. Seeing itself as the sole regional power in the region, Nigeria has been trying to quell the tides of conflicts in the sub-region despite its internal contradictions, some of which have been recently resolved through successful conduct of presidential election in March 28, 2015. This peaceful transition has added weight to Nigeria's hegemonic influence in Africa as hallmark of democratic ethos in the global democratic governance.

Conclusion

The historical milestone aboveshow the hegemonic presence of Nigeria in the global south, most especially in Africa. The multitude of responsibilities being shouldered by various Nigerian governments in multilateral institutions since independence is in realisation of Nigeria's regional power status in West Africa. Such regional power status emanates from internal power matrix as defined by the realist proponents. Such internal matrixes are geographical position, economy, population, military might, natural resources and relative technological advancement. It also needs to be stressed here that the international order of West Africa is unipolar in nature as opposed to most regions where bipolar and multipolar systems predominate. Throughout Africa, only Nigeria and South Africa overwhelmingly dominate their respective regions with little or no challengers. In this case one is right to assert that the regional security complex, as defined by Bary Buzan (2003) Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010), in West Africa is unequivocally unipolar dominated by Nigeria through multilateral mechanism.

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